



(c) crown copyright

Barrage.	Guns.	Battery.	Objective.
M (contd)			Trench I.33.c.40.10 - 20.00 - 05.30.
	(2	29th Bde.	0.9.a.70.90.
	(1	" "	0.9.a.20.90.
N.	(1	" "	0.3.c.35.50.
	(1	" "	0.3.b.10.15.

Rate of Fire.

2 Rounds per gun per minute throughout.

(c) 6" Hows. Zero plus 1 min to Zero plus 16 mins.

As for M Barrage. As many rounds as possible.

(d) 9.45" T.M. Most active T.M. positions in Bois du Vert

(e) 6" Stokes. Active T.M. positions near the mound, 0.3.c and 0.9.a.

(f) Counter Batteries to fire if requested.

(g) Heavy artillery fire to be directed on portions of front line or flank to detract attention from actual front of attack.

(5) Following Liaison Officers will be found :-

(a) At left Battalion H.Q. Senior Subaltern from 135th Battery.

(6) 6" Stokes Mortars will cut wire from 0.2.d.55.80 to 0.2.b.20.50. with particular attention to wire in front of point of entry, of Raiding Party.

(7) A 3" Stokes Barrage will operate on the Front of Attack

(sgd) J.E.Nichols.


Lt. R.F.A.

13/11/1917.

Adjutant, 32nd Brigade, R.F.A.

M GUNS
3" Stokes
18 Pts Standing barrage
4.5' Hous
18 Pts Zero - Zero + 3 mins
18 Pts Zero + 3 - Zero + 15 mins

0 50 100 200 300 400 500




LEGEND.

 Stokes Mortars. Zero minus 1 min to Zero and Zero plus 15 to Zero plus 16.

 Light Artillery Barrage. Zero plus 1 to Zero plus 20 mins.

 Machine Guns. Zero to Zero plus 20 mins.

 Medium Trench Mortars. Zero plus 1 to Zero plus 20 mins

 Artillery.

 Lewis Guns firing bursts.

4th Div. No.G.A.3/19.XXII Corps.

I forward herewith report on the establishment of Bridgeheads across the Trinquis Brook. It was difficult to establish Bridgeheads as the ground was commanded and the Germans seemed anxious to prevent our crossing. I think great credit is due to the Lancashire Fusiliers who got across by surprising the enemy and established and held these bridgeheads under almost continual artillery fire, and frequent attempts to oust them, also to the Engineers who showed great perseverance in putting the bridges over and repairing them when destroyed.

We have thus :-

- (a) got a good base for any further operations.
- (b) got a footing across the obstacle which caused the Germans to be apprehensive of attack and to detain troops in the neighbourhood.
- (c) caused casualties to the Germans.

Our casualties have in all been about 24.

7/10/18.

(signed) L.J.Lipsett, Maj. Gen.
Commanding 4th Division.

XXII Corps No.G.3400.

4th Division.

The Corps Commander has read with much interest the report forwarded with 4th Division No.G.A.3/19 of 7th October.

He considers that much credit is due to all concerned for the determination and energy shown in establishing a footing on the further side of the Trinquis. The work done has greatly facilitated the maintenance of contact with and pressure on the enemy, and has led up to the successful minor operation by the 1st Canadian Division today.

He wishes that his appreciation of their work should be communicated to all concerned.

(signed) C.W.Gwynn,

8/10/18.

B.G., G.S., XXII Corps.

12th Inf. Brigade. No.B.M.1/37/4.

1st King's Own.
2nd Lan. Fus.
2nd Essex Regt.
12th L.T.M. Battery
9th Field Co. R.E.

The Brigadier has much pleasure in forwarding the attached letter from XXII Corps. Will you please see that the Corps Commanders appreciation is communicated to all concerned.

(sgd) GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG Captain.
Brigade Major, 12th Inf. Brigade.

11/10/18.

Report by Capt. A. Howarth, M.C. Commanding "D" Coy.
2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, on enterprise 3/6th October 1918.

The Company relieved the Centre Company King's Own on the night 2/3rd October 1918.

On the morning of the 3rd the Brigadier visited Co. H.G. and expressed his wish that we should cross the Trinquis Brook. He explained the situation and the difficulties to be overcome and asked if I, as a Company Commander, had any suggestions on a scheme for making the crossing. He pointed out that bridging material was at hand and the R.E.'s were at our disposal, also the Artillery, T.M.'s & M.G.'s if necessary. I asked for a little time to appreciate the situation and decided on the method of action, whereupon he left it to me to let him know my decision.

I had a conference with my Platoon Commanders, 2nd Lt. D. Blore and 2nd Lt. E.J.H. Orchard and after a careful study of maps and aeroplane photos, we thought it necessary to reconnoitre the place in daylight. After explaining to the Company Scouts Cpl. Beggs and Pte. Lackey, M.M. they with 2nd Lt. D. Blore reconnoitred the approach to the River. 2nd Lt. E.J.H. Orchard and myself observing the progress from Company O.P. Seeing the river edge gained without opposition, I decided to attempt a crossing.

Lt. E.J.H. Orchard and myself went over the river and while 2nd Lt. D. Blore and the Company Scouts kept a look out, 2nd Lt. E.J.H. Orchard waded waist deep into the river and secured two planks to the dam. That done Cpl. Beggs and Pte. Lackey, M.M., crossed to the N.E. side followed by 2nd Lt. E.J.H. Orchard, 2nd Lt. D. Blore and myself. Time 3:15.

We hurriedly reconnoitred the far bank and found a gun pit and dug out entrance full of water. The two covering L.G. Sects. then moved across and took up positions on the flanks with the Scouts covering the front.

Co. H.Q. and with Orderly previously arranged, sent two platoons to take up positions on the S.W. side of the river. I then returned to Company H.Q. to inform Bn. H.Q. of the situation. Almost immediately the Adjutant came into H.Q. having been up to see the situation and in conjunction with him I informed Brigade H.Q. of the situation and arranged for the present S.O.S. Lines for the Artillery to be altered. At the same time I arranged with the Adjutant to let me have two extra Signallers who were sent up that evening and visual established with the forward posts.

The posts as then established were one at J.26.c.5.6., one in the old gun pit at J.26.c.7.6. and the third in the A.A. Post at J.26.c.9.5.

When the posts were well established I ordered patrols to reconnoitre right and left. An enemy post was found at the sluice gate.

Pte. Taylor opened fire on the position with a L.G. and set fire to a Very Light Dump. The Hun immediately cleared in disorder. By this time many Huns were on the move and afforded some good targets for the Artillery. At the same time C.S.M. Baines, D.C.M. collected the men at Co. H.Q. and carried out overhead fire with success.

By this time the light was failing so we prepared to resist counter attacks but the night passed quietly. 2nd. Lt. D.Blere being on duty throughout the night. Before day-break I relieved the men forward with two platoons from Co. H.Q. and 2nd Lt. E.J.H.Orchard relieving 2nd Lt. D.Blere.

At daybreak the enemy raided the left post but 2nd Lt. E.J.H.Orchard with Sgt. Williams successfully dealt with it, killing one Hun, the rest being put to flight. 2nd E.J.H.Orchard then occupied the sluice gate Pill box, and found the Bosch that was killed. All identification had been removed but a torn up message was found and sent to Bn.H.Q.

At 10 a.m. 2nd E.Halstead from "A" Co. relieved 2nd Lt.